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ARTICLE
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Poster Promotion of the Polio Vaccine to British Publics,
1956–1962
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for the History of Medicine, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the production and dissemination of the
emotive and informative messages promoting polio vaccination
registration in Britain from 1956–1962 through the lens of public
health press advertisements and posters. It argues that as the
press reported on the problems which beset the vaccine cam-
paign, and the various publics who could register for the polio
vaccination multiplied, the campaign’s content changed. Material
was adapted to target the presumed emotional and educational
needs of newly eligible publics. The article contends that by
attending to the emotional content of this campaign, the variety
of publics envisioned by the producers may be examined.
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‘Polio could strike your child’. ‘Polio could strike you’. ‘Polio can strike anyone – even
the ﬁttest’; so declared three newspaper advertisements from the Ministry of Health’s
1959 campaign to increase rates of polio vaccination in Britain [Figure 1].1 Provided to
areas where vaccine uptake was low, these advertisements represent snapshots of an
evolving vaccination campaign which adapted to persuade an ever broader and more
fractured public to seek vaccination. Since the ﬁrst British epidemic in 1947, polio,
a viral disease, had aﬀected thousands of children, sometimes causing muscle weakness,
paralysis, or even death. Eye-catching and emotive, newspaper advertisements and
posters were just one expression of the government’s polio strategy; disseminating
carefully constructed narratives about citizenship, motherhood, youth, and health.2
While the campaign’s engagement with these ideas was familiar from other eﬀorts to
improve public health,3 it also relied on, and battled against, the speciﬁc narratives
which existed around, and were created by, polio.4
This article explores the government’s polio vaccination campaign through its news-
paper advertisements and posters, investigating their cultural, political, and emotional
context. It argues that as the press reported on problems which inhibited the vaccine
campaign, and the various publics who could register for the polio vaccination multi-
plied, the posters changed. They evolved to target the assumed emotional and educa-
tional needs of each newly eligible public through text and image. The British inactivated
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poliomyelitis vaccine (IPV) programme began in 1956 and eﬀectively ended in 1962 with
the introduction of a new oral vaccine. Initially, IPV – a vaccine using inactivated strains
of poliovirus and injected into the patient – was oﬀered only to children. However, the
Ministry of Health gradually expanded the eligibility criteria to include young adults and
then everyone under the age of 40; an incremental widening of targeted ‘publics’ across
the late 1950s and early 1960s. This meant that unlike previous vaccine campaigns which
focused on infants, the campaign had to evolve to reach diﬀerent groups, requiring those
producing promotion materials to imagine these publics (and their emotions) in diﬀer-
ent ways.5 This can be seen in the way early poster and newspaper adverts explained
IPV’s beneﬁts to the mothers of infants, whereas later propaganda emphasised the
ﬁnancial risks to the family if a father were struck by the disease6: the emotionally
inﬂected images and text of the posters were adapted as key target audiences changed.
Focusing on the emotional dimensions of the polio vaccination campaign facilitates our
exploration of the nature of the relationship between public health policymakers and the
public. The perceived need to manage and manipulate the emotions which various
‘publics’ were assumed to possess exposes their constructed nature, but also complicates
simplistic understandings of rationality in policy making and practice.
This article discusses the production and dissemination of messages promoting polio
vaccination, tracing ideas about both the public and the vaccine back and forth through
the archive and into the public sphere via posters and the news print media. This article
does not set out to explore the extent to which these materials worked in terms of
increasing vaccine uptake. The eﬀectiveness of the publicity is diﬃcult to unpick from
the impact of the widely reported supply crises and political problems which dogged the
vaccine campaign.7 Moreover, these have been detailed elsewhere.8 Instead, this article
performs a close textual analysis of a variety of government issued newspaper adver-
tisements, posters and contemporary newspaper reports to understand the campaign’s
Figure 1. Set of ‘Polio could strike’ posters aimed at ensuring diﬀerent cohorts were vaccinated,
dated left to right 1959, 1959, 1960.
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emotional context and content. While not exhaustive of all the vaccination educational
material produced by the government over the period, they formed the backbone of
national (UK-wide) advertisements which were supplemented by local eﬀorts.
We begin with an explanation of our analytic, situating the posters and advertise-
ments as objects methodologically and historically. By making use of a combination of
techniques drawn from Bakhtinian literary analysis and the history of emotions, we
access some of the emotions behind the textual record of the IPV campaign. This
illuminates the government’s evolving assumptions about the various publics they were
attempting to persuade to register for the IPV. This approach reveals that the public
were a fractured entity, envisioned by the state as groups of rational and irrational
emotional communities. As the vaccination programme expanded to include older
publics, ideas about IPV, the public and citizenship were overlaid and combined, rather
than replaced, allowing a layering of ideas which reached multiple groups through
singular texts. Simultaneously, we argue that while it is not our purpose to recover the
lived experience of those publics interacting with this campaign, their experiences were,
albeit in a limited way, constitutive to the campaign’s trajectory and outcomes. The
public were not an inert entity acted on only from above, rather they were a fractured,
reactive and unpredictable force which often forced policymakers to respond to their
demands for reassurance, information and vaccines.9
Conceptualising publics, texts and emotions
The creation of a ‘text’10 for the consumption of the public is an innately political act
which transmits both normative and unforeseen ideas about what the public is, should
and could be. This perspective, borrowing from Lacan, usefully locates the ends, and
audiences, constructed through didactic textual elements; those images and words
intended to educate, persuade or dissuade, and which thereby reveal and create the
producer’s ﬂawed and ideal imagined audiences.11 Bakhtin reminds us texts are arte-
facts produced not just by their creators, but also by their situated audiences, received
within, and changed by, a cultural context in ﬂux. Intertextuality acknowledges this
instability and the ‘work-like’ aspects of texts: those dialogical elements which supple-
ment ‘empirical reality by adding to, and subtracting from’ it – the underlying imagina-
tion, motives and emotions of audience and producer evident in the ideologies and
narratives captured by the text and its reception.12
Applying this intertextual methodology to public health advertisements and posters
is revealing. Posters operate as a particular kind of text. Timmers suggests posters are
the ‘product of communication between an active force and a reactive one’; the
originator has a ‘message to sell’ which the recipient must be persuaded to ‘buy’.13
Indeed, when the poster emerged in the late nineteenth century, its primary subject was
advertisements for products available in the growing consumer economy.14 Posters
were soon deployed for other uses though, and while those delivering public health
messages were rare before the First World War, after this period they were increasingly
used to communicate messages around issues such as tuberculosis, venereal disease and
alcoholism.15 Far from neutral texts, Cooter and Stein assert that the public health
poster ‘moralizes behavior, guiding the viewer to a clear notion of what is or is not
socially acceptable.’16 Posters did not simply speak for themselves.17 As Gilman reminds
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us, the vocabulary of posters was complex and contradictory, open to multiple readings
that changed over time and place.18
While it is diﬃcult to access the experiences of the publics which interacted with posters
and advertisements, as Myers points out, pedagogic texts are the product of a ‘two-way
traﬃc between producer and consumer’ and the context in which these are propagated.19
Conceiving of texts in this way also provides the tools to excavate the underlying emotions
and emotional communities,20 both lived and imagined which fostered, produced and were
reproduced by the text.21 Here, we draw on Rosenwein’s concept of the ‘emotional
community’ to guide our analysis. Emotional communities are ‘the same as social com-
munities,’ but as Rosenwein argues, the researcher’s emphasis is upon the ‘systems of
feeling’ which govern them – what these ‘communities (and the individuals within them)
deﬁne and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations [. . .] about other’s
emotions; the nature of the aﬀective bonds between people that they recognize; and the
modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate, and deplore.’22 An
intertextual approach, with its emphasis on the lived experience of both audiences and
producers, combined with the attention to emotion Rosenwein encourages, reveals the
emotional dialogues expressed within a text, gesturing to the emotional communities (lived
and imagined) which form the context for the text’s creation and reception, while empha-
sising the normative power behind these elements. By understanding the productive work
of the makers of polio vaccination posters as taking place within an emotional community,
we are able to contextualise the posters’ emotional elements and the work they do as texts.
In turn, this close reading can illuminate the authors’ vision of the public as a variety of
emotional communities.
These approaches are especially germane to the study of the polio vaccination cam-
paigns because of the volume of comment on the emotions, predominantly fear and
anxiety, that surrounded the disease. Indeed, Williams titled his poliomyelitis biography
Paralysed with Fear.23 Yet, despite pervasive acknowledgement of the power of these
emotions and their ubiquitous presence within discussions of polio, the British historio-
graphy lacks a thorough dealing with its emotional history.24 This article begins the work
needed to redress this lacuna by exploring which emotions various publics were assumed
to be feeling about IPV and which emotions were deployed to persuade them to seek
vaccination.
Assumptions about the emotional nature of the public have long played a role in
public health policy and practice. As Cantor points out, pre-war medical elites imagined
the public as emotionally disturbed, unable to control their behaviour and in danger of
being led astray by their emotions.25 Until the 1950s, according to Toon, large parts of
the ‘cancer establishment’ believed that the public were so afraid of cancer that eﬀorts to
educate them about the disease were counterproductive.26 Despite these reservations,
health education was part of public health practice since at least the nineteenth century,
based on the idea that the public could be instructed in rational behaviour. While health
education in the inter-war period focused on topics such as personal hygiene, mother-
hood and the promotion of good citizenship, by the middle of the twentieth century, as
infectious disease gave way to chronic disease, campaigns increasingly targeted indivi-
dual behaviour in order to prevent ill-health.27 Vaccination, although still focused on
infectious disease rather than new threats to public health like smoking and diet, ﬁtted
this preventive ethos.
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Eﬀorts to promote vaccination also encapsulated the tension-ﬁlled dichotomy
between rationality and irrationality often present in health education. The public
were imagined as both obstacle and solution to polio – as both rational and emotional –
able to act in a way that could prevent polio by registering for the vaccination, or to
spread the disease if they failed to vaccinate. This resulted in the construction of
diﬀerent ‘publics’. The public were simultaneously: individuals or groups vulnerable
to disease; threats to the stability of the state as potential vectors for the spread of
disease; and the mechanism by which, if persuaded to vaccinate, disease might be
prevented. Addressing these three publics – potential victim, vector and vaccinator –
the government presented the problem of polio as soluble through the actions of
obedient citizens. In seeking vaccination, they availed themselves of a new medical
technology, guarded the nation against calamity and ensured the possibility of a polio-
free future. This narrative of futurity, inherent in preventative medicine, was bolstered
throughout the polio vaccine campaign by an emphasis on the availability and newness
of the polio vaccine. This was coupled with highlighting vaccination as a duty of
citizenship. For parents, this meant protecting children as future citizens.28 For young
people who could self-register, vaccination operated as a task marking entry into
a future as citizens. In the case of older married men, vaccination oﬀered an ensured
continuation of their status as breadwinners through the prevention of the potentially
incapacitating eﬀects of polio. Thus, vaccination was associated with modern citizen-
ship, an essential part of a desirable lifestyle for young adults and parents alike. Health
oﬃcials emphasised the beneﬁts of vaccination to the individual, but the undertones
were clear. Parents were morally obliged to protect themselves and their children from
now-preventable diseases to reduce the risk of disability and expensive medical care in
the future. At the same time, vaccination was presented as a ‘gift’ of modern, techno-
cratic medicine and the social rights of the nascent welfare state – albeit a gift that one
ought not to refuse.29
Polio, the polio vaccine and emotion
Polio was a ‘virgin soil’ infection of the modern period and the ﬁrst epidemic did not
hit Britain until 1947.30 Anxieties were exacerbated by medical science’s inability to
oﬀer much defence against the disease.31 Indeed, contrary to contemporary public
health science, good sanitation and hygiene appeared to make a country more suscep-
tible, with wealthy suburbs and inner-city slums aﬀected in equal measure.32 Although
most infected people do not present with any symptoms, in severe cases polio can cause
limb weakness, paralysis or death.33 Therapies were developed to ameliorate acute
symptoms (such as the iron lung to combat paralysis of the diaphragm) and long-
term rehabilitation (such as callipers and crutches to combat chronic muscle weakness),
but no cure was ever found.34 The only long-term solution, therefore, was prophylaxis
in the form of a vaccine.
The story of polio in Britain was not limited by its national borders – press coverage
followed the disease (and attempts combat it) internationally, focusing particularly on
the eﬀects of polio, vaccine research and fund-raising eﬀorts in America, such as the
March of Dimes.35 In 1955, in front of the world’s media, researchers at the University
of Michigan announced that they had successfully produced a vaccine based on
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a formula developed by Jonas Salk, and within hours the US government licenced its
use. The British government, traditionally cautious about introducing new vaccines,
began trials through its Medical Research Council (MRC), encouraging the Daily Mail’s
enthusiastic 1955 front-page declaration: ‘Now Polio Vaccine For All – Britain to Buy it
for the Health Service’.36 This optimism belied the complex web of emotions which
circulated around the idea of a polio vaccine. While fear of polio was pervasive in the
1950s, there were also reasons to fear the vaccine. Soon after IPV became widely
available in the USA, Cutter Laboratories released a batch of vaccine containing
poliovirus which had not been properly inactivated. The incident, which was widely
reported by the British press, infected hundreds and led to the deaths of 10 people,
shaking the conﬁdence of governments and publics in vaccine manufacturers, doctors,
and the arms of government responsible for vaccine rollout.37 As the Daily Express
surmised in 1955, ‘the [American] government stands accused of negligence, manu-
factures of proﬁteering, and doctors of running a black market’, while ‘Health Minister
Ian Macleod assured M.P.s that all Salk vaccine [. . .] would be most rigorously tested’
and ‘there will be no delay going ahead.’38 Fallout from the Cutter incident aﬀected
potential IPV programmes globally.39 In Britain, the government decided not to
abandon IPV, but to insist that a new British formula should be used which would
be less prone to manufacturing mistakes, more potent and safer.40
Despite the Cutter Incident, there was great appetite for the vaccine in the UK.41
Vaccination had become increasingly important in British public health policy since the
1940s. The new health service had begun to provide (or was in the process of testing
and licensing) vaccines against diphtheria, whooping cough and tuberculosis.42 When
Minister of Health Robin Turton ﬁnally announced the introduction of the British IPV
programme in 1956, the Ministry organised a large press conference to convey the
news.43 However, the Cutter Incident had forced the Ministry to abandon American
IPV and shift to a British formula mere months before the programme was planned to
start, meaning that only two companies had licences to manufacture this new type of
IPV, and only one had the capacity to deliver the vaccine at the start of the
programme.44
Controversy and cohorts
The intention behind the programme was that all children under the age of 10 and
certain NHS staﬀ would receive the vaccine – initially in two doses, later three.45 To
distribute scarce supplies evenly, parents registered their children with the local Medical
Oﬃcer of Health (MOH) who would then contact the family when IPV became
available. The MRC also hoped to test the eﬀectiveness of the vaccine by using the
registration scheme to manage a cohort study.46 This meant that parents could not
simply present their child at the clinic and have the procedure done as with other
immunisations. Even if they did register, the MRC’s selection method meant that there
was a good chance their child would not be part of the ﬁrst wave of those to be
vaccinated.
Given this complication, it is perhaps unsurprising that registration rates were lower
than expected. Moreover, the freedom aﬀorded to MOsH produced variable results. By
summer 1957, vaccination rates ranged from 87% in the best-performing district to 20% in
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the worst (with a national average of 29). Even as supplies became available and the
programme was extended to all children under the age of 15 in September 1957, registra-
tion was still low. By autumn 1958, it was clear that registration rates were well below the
desired coverage in many counties. A nationally co-ordinated publicity campaign would, it
was hoped, improve the situation. However, while Ministry oﬃcials agreed that ‘stimulus’
in the form of publicity was necessary, they also noted that a ‘national publicity campaign
would probably be a waste of eﬀort and money’. Instead, the government believed targeted
campaigns in poorly performing areas would be more eﬀective.47 Advertisements were
placed in the local newspapers of poorly performing districts, while posters were distrib-
uted to waiting rooms and other interested parties as they had been during the diphtheria
propaganda campaign.48
For parents of young children – particularly mothers – vaccination was already
a known entity, and government eﬀorts to increase uptake were nothing new.49
A national smallpox vaccination programme existed from 1840, and the subsequent
success of the war-time diphtheria immunisation campaign had demonstrated the beneﬁts
and power of modern vaccine technology.50 National and local authorities were similarly
experienced in making contact with parents – usually mothers – through advertising and
face-to-face contact via health visitors and interactions at clinics.51 Debates about falling
diphtheria immunisation and subsequent advertising earlier in the decade had established
the importance of vaccination and the role citizens ought to play in the maintenance of
their family’s health – and had also targeted mothers of young children. Moreover, even
before the dedicated winter vaccination promotion campaign of 1958/59, the British public
already knew about IPV. There had been consistent press coverage of the disease, the
development of this new technology and issues with supply throughout the 1950s.52
Locally, MOsH and their staﬀ worked with regional newspapers, community groups and
parents to let them know about the vaccine and the procedure for obtaining it.53 Thus,
when the vaccination registration drive began, the government did not need to create
awareness of the vaccine or instil ‘good citizenship’ in the population from scratch.
This context meant that the vaccine and the accompanying education campaign did
not enter the target publics’ consciousness unencumbered; nor was the need for
vaccination, as comprehended within the Ministry of Health and target health autho-
rities, simply communicated to newly identiﬁed target groups in the form of raw
epidemiological data. Within the Ministry, the various incarnations of imagined target
publics, constructed from epidemiological data then rendered numerically, geographi-
cally and according to date-of-birth, were further subdivided into the registered,
unregistered and those requiring a third vaccination. These subdivisions identiﬁed
groups in need of registration and vaccination with exactitude, but were too complex
to communicate directly to the public. In fact, publicity materials which explicitly
targeted those born after a certain date were abandoned for more simplistic age ranges
when it was realised that ‘people did not connect a date of this kind to their own age’.54
This moved Ministry campaigns in line with newspapers which reported the vaccine’s
availability to new cohorts using age ranges rather than dates of birth.55 When adver-
tising eﬀorts included images, much of the imagery and text was designed to do dual
service; targeting the under-10s alongside older cohorts in subscript. Posters often
captured attention using the salient image of a vulnerable infant, while written encour-
agements told parents to also seek vaccination for older children.
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The vaccination programme and publicity campaign’s traditional focus on young
children needed to be balanced with eﬀorts to reach new target publics as the age range
of those to be vaccinated expanded. Although there were further supply issues over the
course of 1958, by the autumn the Ministry felt it was able to extend the programme.
From September, young adults up to the age of 26 were oﬀered the vaccine.56 Initially,
the Ministry struggled to get young adults interested. They were, however, epidemio-
logically important. While children were far more likely to contract polio and to
become paralysed, adults with polio were more likely to die from the disease.57 For
adults without young children, the Ministry planned a new publicity campaign to
improve uptake. The remainder of this article discusses these developments, excavating
the diﬀerent ways target cohorts were imagined by the campaigns’ producers, and for
those members of the public who were assumed to have agency, persuaded.
Phase 1. ‘they may have cause to reproach themselves’: the 1958/59 winter
polio publicity campaign
The 1958/1959 publicity campaign was a response to the uneven national uptake of the
polio vaccine; the perception that a ‘good year’ for polio might lead to low press
coverage of polio and consequently parental complacency regarding the need to register
their children for vaccination; and also a response to direct requests from local health
authorities struggling to raise registration rates.58 Production of newspaper adverts and
posters evolved quickly, moving from text-heavy designs to more striking graphical
depictions of children being struck by lightning bolts. A Ministry of Health civil servant
explained the intent behind the written and visual elements of the ﬁrst iteration of the
1958 publicity campaign, admitting the text-heavy advertisement was a little on ‘the
long side’ but it was felt that ‘in view of the time element’ they should not plan:
any attempt to use a visual in the press advertisement (which might otherwise be based on
one of the photographs of children being vaccinated by a clinic doctor) and get our eﬀect
by a quoted extract from a Statement by the Minister set out under a striking heading, with
plenty of white space around it, based on the wording of the Minister’s interview with
television.59
The implications behind this letter were that while the more time-consuming addition
of a visual element would achieve greater impact, (as would shorter, punchier copy),
these shortcomings would not negate the persuasive and informative ‘eﬀect’ of the
advertisement if it employed a ‘striking’ title and ‘white space’. Even without the
suggested images of children being vaccinated, (or images of children aﬀected by
polio, which were typical of the American vaccination campaign), the advertisement’s
bold title was eye-catching (see Figure 2).
The opening lines stated that: ‘Polio is not yet beaten. Next year may be one of Nature’s
bad polio years. Vaccination is our chief defence.’60 These words, chosen from a television
interview with the Minister of Health, were more than informative. The advertisement
sought to borrow authority from the Minister himself. His words responded to ideas about
the polio vaccine already circulating in the public sphere which might reduce vaccine
registration, while reiterating existing ideas which might persuade the public to vaccinate.
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There were two key elements at work here. First, eradicating polio was presented as a battle
with ‘Nature’, here depicted as a force given substance through syntax: the possessive
apostrophe; the capital ‘N’; and the idea that it held enough agency to be ‘beaten’ imputing
a power which rendered those who vaccinated (and those who provided the vaccine)
heroic in the face of a fearsome foe. Second, vaccination was presented as a ‘defence’
belonging to a public and government allied against polio and in pursuit of herd immunity
through the use of ‘our’, gesturing to the idea of a collective good. Vaccination was part of
the social rights bestowed on Britain’s publics, supposedly the hallmarks of the new welfare
state era.61 But it was also a duty, ‘good’ citizens must vaccinate for the sake of their own
(and, by association, the nation’s) children, a concept established during the war with
Figure 2. Polio – The Minster of Health says.
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diphtheria immunisation.62 This heroic narrative of a manageable present and future
threat established, the text then moved to its second main tactic, persuasion through
shame and blame:
Nearly seven million children have already been vaccinated.
What about the others?
Parents should not hang back.
If they do, they may have cause to reproach themselves later on.
The vaccine – all of which is safety tested – is there. My advice is don’t delay.
No longer was Nature alone culpable for polio’s scourge. Now parents who ‘hang back’
or ‘delay’ registration and vaccination of their children ‘may have cause to reproach
themselves’. The pairing of risk with blame here performs a normative function –
encouraging the avoidance of blame through the avoidance of risk. Simultaneously, the
risk was rendered manageable and personal, shifting responsibility for polio infection
from Nature or the health service, to parents. This transference of responsibility for the
unvaccinated was signiﬁcant given the government’s litany of failures regarding sup-
plies. The statement ‘The vaccine – all of which is safety tested – is there’ dismissed
circulating fears around supply issues and the relative safety and eﬃcaciousness of the
British and American vaccines.
The public imagined by public health oﬃcials and constructed through this advertise-
ment was one requiring instruction and reassurance, but also one open to persuasion. It
was a public of adult guardians assumed to have shared emotions and knowledge of polio,
aware of the new vaccine, willing to be moved by ideas of children’s vulnerability,
conscious of their responsibilities towards their family’s health, but requiring encourage-
ment to take the ﬁnal step towards vaccination. Children as a public were constructed
here not as recipients of the text, but as an aﬀective device; victims of parental failure to
act, or mere elements in the ‘defence’ against Nature, the product of a successful alliance
of parental and State authority. The child who contracted polio, constructed by the future
self ‘reproach’ of parents who failed to vaccinate, was thus rendered a symptom of
inadequate parenting and so citizenship – rather than the State’s failure to provide
protection. Indeed, fear and blame, not the promise of citizenship, were increasingly
used to persuade the public to vaccinate.
Phase 2. ‘It can leave your child crippled for life’: parents, risk and blame
At a cursory glance, Figures 2 and 3 appear similar; however, they represent a shift in
approach from tentative encouragement (which assumed an obedient public) to a more
robust engagement with a public in need of urgent persuasion through fear and shame.
Beginning with the subtitle in large bold letters, the advertisement in Figure 3 delivered
an imperative message: ‘Register your children for vaccination this week’, giving both
an actionable instruction with a deadline and rendering the responsibility of the action
personal through the use of ‘your’ rather than the previously favoured collective ‘our’ or
plural ‘parents’ deployed in Figure 2.63 The desired outcome and responsibility for
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action established, the poster then proceeded to press parents through fear, shame,
reassurance and the provision of information.
The ﬁrst paragraph of the advertisement (Figure 3) began with the present tense
statement ‘Polio Paralyses’, delivered as an immutable fact in bold capitals. This
established, it then sketched the grim future which might follow parental failure to
seek vaccination registration:
It can leave your child crippled for life – unable ever again to walk naturally. If this
happened, you would never forgive yourself – when you could so easily have prevented it
by applying for vaccination.
Once again children’s presence within the text was reduced to an emblematic function,
a symptom ‘for life’ of a guardian’s failure to ‘easily’ register their child which can
Figure 3. ‘You would never forgive yourself’.
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‘never’ be forgiven. The use of em dashes to break the prose forced a pause for
meditation upon the idea of the ‘child crippled for life’, the description made more
vivid by the layering of additional details – ‘unable ever again to walk naturally’ – which
conjured images of mechanical assistance. While the words themselves are emotive, and
told the adult audience how to feel, they also relied on the tropes and images of
previous representations of polio and its reputation as infantile paralysis.
The second and third paragraphs drew on tactics of information and reassurance to
encourage guardians to register their children for vaccination, oﬀering timely registra-
tion as a rational demonstration of forward planning. While it was explained that
immunity was not developed immediately after vaccination – a point likely stressed
in response to the upswing in vaccination registration which followed any outbreak of
polio despite the vaccine’s inability to provide immediate prophylaxis – reassurance was
given; ‘your children will be protected by the Spring, when polio cases start to increase.’
The reassurance continues with
Vaccination is free, simple, almost painless and leaves no scar. All vaccine is stringently
tested to meet [MRC] safety standards.
The dismissal of fears around cost, pain and scarring hark back to earlier health
procedures, which had to be paid for before the NHS was established or, in the case
of smallpox vaccination, free, but rather unpleasant. The reference to ‘stringent testing’
acted as more than a reassurance: it attempted to dismiss lingering fears connected to
the Cutter Incident, ongoing confusion around the eﬃcacy and safety of the American
versus the British vaccine, and gave an explanation for well publicised delays caused by
the destruction of batches of vaccines found to be wanting.64 This rationalisation of
delay was then followed by ‘There is plenty for everyone up to 25ʹ, a reassurance
somewhat diminished by the ‘especially for babies, toddlers and young children – and
for all expectant mothers, too’ which followed this statement and belied the continued
rationing of the vaccine and growing waiting lists which plagued some boroughs.
Indeed, while childless adults under-25 might technically have been able to seek the
vaccine through registration, they were not the public addressed or imagined by this
poster. The ﬁnal line of the poster hammers this point home ‘Act now – your child’s life
may be at stake’.
Phase 3. ‘Injections-while-you-dance!’ Vaccination as a marker of agency
and healthy citizenship among teenagers, young adults and adult men
Older cohorts, adolescents, and young adults living outside the family unit presented
a new challenge to public health authorities who had far less experience advertising
vaccination to them. Hitherto, immunisation had been oﬀered to children via parents
or speciﬁc adults placed at risk through employment. With young adults, the target and
the agent making the decision to seek vaccination were one and the same. Yet, they had
not typically been the recipients of vaccination and, initially at least, they were reluctant
to present themselves, probably because they felt that they were not at risk of polio and
did not see the reward of protection against the disease as worth the eﬀort of registering
for the vaccine.65
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The government responded to the needs of young adults creatively, targeting them
where they worked and recreated both literally – by running vaccine drives and placing
posters in these spaces – and ﬁguratively through a new set of posters tailored to entice
this cohort into registration [see Figure 4]. They began by reusing posters aimed at
earlier target audiences, albeit with ‘better colour’.66 It was also suggested, however, that
the Central Council for Health Education ‘produce another poster specially addressed
to the 15–26 age group suitable for display in such places as technical colleges, youth
clubs, factories, etc.’67 Another idea was to amend a vaccine registration promotion ‘tv
ﬁller’ so that it spoke directly to this older cohort.68 As with earlier stages, speciﬁc
eﬀorts were aimed at enticing 15–26s to register for vaccination – but the publicity was
designed to target other cohorts too. As Heald explained in a letter regarding posters to
local authorities with particularly low uptake: ‘one is primarily directed to the under-16
age group and the other the 16 to 26 age group, but each includes mention of the other
and of expectant mothers.’69 These eﬀorts multiplied the available discourses surround-
ing vaccination registration. While ideas of parental responsibility and the threat of
paralysis to children still featured – with space given over to telling parents to register
children – posters targeted at unattached under 26s were dominated by representations
of youthful independence which created an association between vaccination registration
and the achievement of rational agency.
Figure 4. Targeting older cohorts, 1959.
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By associating vaccination spatially and ﬁguratively with activities which demon-
strated independence from the familial unit – work and dancing – posters conveyed
the idea that like ﬁnancial independence and the procurement of a date for a dance,
vaccination registration was a marker of maturity and success. The form of citizenship
presented here depicted normative values associated with being a modern, young
adult in the same way that it had represented ‘good parenting’ when targeting other
cohorts. These tactics would eventually come to garner positive media interest, the
story no longer entirely about supply issues and failed batches, but the unusual eﬀorts
of health authorities to stimulate (and then meet) rising demand amongst the youth-
ful population.70
Indeed, there was an increase in uptake of polio vaccination from young people in 1959,
but this was the result of an event out of the government’s control. On 4 April 1959,
England international footballer Jeﬀ Hall died of polio days after playing for Birmingham
City.71 That a young, healthy man could die suddenly and apparently at random shocked
people into registering for IPV.72 The Ministry co-ordinated a message from the Health
Minister Derek Walker-Smith at all Football League matches the weekend following Hall’s
death, and many clubs took the opportunity to vaccinate their squads in front of national
and local media cameras.73 The resulting surge in demand caused signiﬁcant supply
problems in certain areas, but in the long run the improved uptake among this cohort
was welcomed.
Though Hall’s death undoubtedly led to an increase in vaccination rates, the innova-
tive measures of health authorities across the country should not be overlooked.
Injections ‘while you dance’, declared a Manchester Guardian article on 8 April 1959,
reporting the various eﬀorts of health authorities around the country to reach the under
26s.74 The article stated that:
An ‘injections-while-you-dance’ scheme is to be operated in Bristol to encourage immunisa-
tion among the under 25s and, in addition to medical teams visiting factories, approaches are
to be made to youth and dance halls with a view to give injections to young people. In clubs
and halls dance records will be interrupted for propaganda announcements.75
An approach that was already part of the ongoing polio vaccination publicity campaign
thus became newsworthy in the face of Hall’s death.
Phase 4 – ‘15 million people.. have been given this protection already.
WHAT ABOUT YOU?’ Persuading the 26–40s to vaccinate
It was ironic that, aged 29, Hall would have been too old to be part of the IPV
programme in 1959, even if he had sought out vaccination. This, and a number of
other factors, meant that the government decided to extend the eligibility criteria to
cover all citizens under 40 from January 1960. The reasons for this were threefold. First,
the expanded programme had been a pledge in the Conservatives’ 1959 general election
manifesto. Despite the supply problems and negative publicity, the programme was
considered one of the party’s examples of a commitment to the nation’s health. Second,
the Ministry felt capable of delivering IPV now that the majority of under 26s likely to
present themselves had done so, and enough children had been vaccinated so that the
demand from this group had largely reduced to the annual birth rate. Third, the
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pharmaceutical company Pﬁzer had begun to produce IPV from its British plant,
improving the supply situation.76 However, informed audiences (and interested news-
paper readers) knew that the oral polio vaccine being developed by Albert Sabin was
likely to be used in the near future.77 Sensing that demand for IPV would not last long,
Pﬁzer ﬂooded the market. Caught on the back foot, the Ministry calculated that it
would be cheaper for the Treasury to buy the vaccine in bulk for use in the vaccination
programme than allow Pﬁzer to make it available on prescription (where the NHS
would have to pay full price for every individual injection oﬀered). This new cohort,
then, was created out of speciﬁc ﬁnancial as well as epidemiological circumstances. This
cohort was at lower risk of paralysis or death than younger citizens. Still, disability
carried signiﬁcant economic risks which might destabilise the entire family unit; and it
was these risks which were addressed by the ﬁnal stage of the polio advertising
campaign.
The campaign to encourage the 26–40 cohort to vaccinate themselves intensiﬁed across
1961. Posters played upon the ideas which previous iterations had deployed, and they
consciously harked back to the success of earlier campaigns. Echoing earlier posters in
typeface, tone and through direct quotation, Figure 5 triumphantly announced ‘15 million
people – children, expectant mothers, grown-ups – have been given this protection
Figure 5. ‘15 million people.. have been given this protection already. WHAT ABOUT YOU?’ 1960.
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already’ before asking accusingly in bold capitals, ‘what about you?’Here, the narrative was
not so much one of polio’s threat and parental neglect (though these ideas remained
important and were generated by words like ‘strike’ and ‘cripple’) but the eﬃcient and
expected expansion of the vaccine campaign facilitated by dutiful citizens registering.
Citizenship duties for this cohort were not only discussed by the government. Pﬁzer’s
own promotional material shifted the focus away from young-adult socialising and
emphasised instead the parental duty, particularly of fathers, to remain healthy bread-
winners and administrators of the nuclear household.78
By overtly signalling previous campaign success alongside the question ‘what about
you?’ the advertisement conveyed the idea that expanding vaccination to the 26–40 age
group was an inevitable sign of a successfully functioning health system, and that those
who failed to avail themselves were reneging on the responsibilities of healthy citizen-
ship which could be easily achieved.79 This subtle narrative of inevitable expansion of
the campaign and the normalisation of vaccination registration – and so the deviance of
failing to vaccinate – was even more explicit in Figure 6.
Appearing to be an annotated reprint of a previously circulated poster, the crossed
out number added a hint of humour and signalled government eﬃciency, redrawing the
narrative around vaccination from that of expense, ineﬃciency and supply issues, to
a streamlined natural evolution of a successful health campaign.80
While Hall’s death, election promises, and the manoeuvrings of Pﬁzer might have
forced the hand of government to extend the vaccination campaign to the under 40s in
a hurry, it was generally met with media approval and ultimately marked a successful
end to the attempts of the government to grapple with polio. The change in tone from
Figure 6. It’s [now] available free to all up to age 26 40.
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threat and shame to humour and ubiquity was mirrored in press coverage. Gone were
tales of children waiting for vaccinations the government was unable to provide, instead
newspapers reported optimistically the expanded cohorts and coming technological
innovation of an oral vaccine, declaring ‘Safety on a lump of sugar’81 or ‘under 40s
will get anti-polio in three lumps’.82
Conclusion
The apparent success of the polio vaccination campaign should not blind us to the
problems with its introduction and the anxieties that surrounded the disease through-
out the 1950s and beyond. Campaign materials were conﬁdent in their presentation of
polio vaccination as a way to combat the disease, despite the sometimes chaotic reality
of the programme itself and the press’ representation of it as such.83 Just as the adverts
and posters obscured the disarray that existed on an administrative level, they reveal
other, deeper truths. Tracing the emotive content which became a hallmark of this
campaign and the interactions of the emotional communities which formed around this
disease alerts us to the productive ‘work’ of emotions. Negative emotions such as fear
and guilt were played upon within the posters, but positive emotions were also
mobilised, such as humour and appeals to young peoples’ burgeoning sense of their
own adulthood.
But the work of emotions in this campaign went beyond a simple persuasive tactic
intended to increase vaccination uptake. By identifying and building on existing emo-
tional communities, the Ministry of Health were also engaged in creating new groups;
the focus on particular target populations transforming emotional communities into
a set of overlapping publics. These publics were imagined simultaneously as potential
victims, vectors and vaccinators. Unvaccinated children were presented, without
agency, as both vectors of disease and victims of parental failure to act as rational
citizens. Vaccinating one’s child becoming both an act of good parenting and citizen-
ship. Vaccination was thus a right and a duty: something a parent demanded to protect
their child, but also something that they did to ensure collective well-being through the
establishment of herd immunity. These narratives around good citizenship highlight the
ways in which socio-political rights and responsibilities are emotional, as well as
practical and material. Vaccination continues to be an emotive topic, but by assessing
the role played by emotions in previous campaigns, we are better placed to understand
their function in the present.
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